Agentic Security Glossary
Comprehensive terminology for AI agent security, autonomous treasury management, and circuit breaker protocols used in production deployments.
Security Architecture: AgentSentry uses Non-Human Identity (NHI) scoping to assign each AI agent a unique cryptographic identity, which it uses to propose verified transactions to a Squads V4 multisig — ensuring agents operate within declared parameters.
Security Terminology
Technical definitions with implementation examples
Hallucination Latency — A mandatory cooling-off period enforced before an agent can execute high-value trades, allowing deterministic validation to complete before a probabilistic LLM decision reaches the chain. This delay window ensures policy checks have time to run, preventing hasty executions based on potentially hallucinated data.
Hallucination Latency
Security Protocolsconst config = {
hallucinationLatencyMs: 3000, // 3-second mandatory delay
highValueThreshold: 10_000, // SOL
};
await sentry.checkIn({
...declaration,
enforceLatency: declaration.action.amount > config.highValueThreshold,
});Agentic Provenance — The complete, immutable history of why an AI agent made a specific financial decision — including raw inputs, reasoning chain, confidence score, and validation status — stored as a Decision Trace. Essential for regulatory compliance and post-incident analysis.
Agentic Provenance
Audit & Complianceconst provenance: AgenticProvenance = {
agentId: "eliza-trader-001",
inputs: { oraclePrice, marketDepth, mcpData },
reasoningChain: agent.getDecisionPath(),
confidenceScore: 0.87,
validationStatus: "CLEARED",
traceHash: sha256(JSON.stringify(trace)),
};
await sentry.logProvenance(provenance);Deterministic Intent — A transaction intent that is cryptographically committed before execution and cannot be altered by probabilistic LLM inference. Contrasted with 'probabilistic intent' where the LLM alone determines the final action without a pre-committed hash verification.
Deterministic Intent
Security Protocolsconst intent = {
agentId, action: "SWAP", amount: "100", tokenMint: "SOL",
timestamp: Date.now(),
};
const deterministicHash = sha256(
intent.agentId + intent.action + intent.amount +
intent.tokenMint + intent.timestamp
);
// Hash is immutable — LLM cannot alter post-commitmentA2A Handshake Protocol — The security verification layer required when two autonomous AI agents negotiate or exchange value. Both agents must produce signed declarations and verify each other's identity before any on-chain transfer occurs, preventing unauthorized agent-to-agent transactions.
A2A Handshake Protocol
Security Protocolsconst handshake = await sentry.initiateA2AHandshake({
initiator: { agentId: "trader-01", declaration },
counterparty: { agentId: "lender-02" },
proposedAction: { type: "BORROW", amount: 1000 },
});
if (handshake.bothVerified) {
await executeA2ATransaction(handshake.txHash);
}Shadow AI Perimeter — The boundary between AI agents officially approved by an organization's security team and unauthorized agents running with API keys or hot wallets that have never been audited or registered. Identifying and securing this perimeter is critical for enterprise security.
Shadow AI Perimeter
Enterprise Securityconst perimeterScan = await sentry.auditPerimeter({
organizationWallets: ["wallet1...", "wallet2..."],
registeredAgents: agentRegistry,
});
perimeterScan.unregisteredAgents.forEach(agent => {
console.log(`Unregistered agent detected: ${agent.address}`);
});NHI Blast Radius — The maximum financial damage a Non-Human Identity agent can cause if its credentials are compromised or its LLM hallucinates — quantified as the maximum callable treasury balance minus enforced spending limits. Minimizing blast radius is a core security objective.
NHI Blast Radius
Risk Assessmentconst blastRadius = await sentry.calculateBlastRadius({
agentId: "eliza-trader-001",
treasuryBalance: 100_000, // SOL
enforcedLimits: {
maxSingleTx: 1_000,
dailyVolume: 5_000,
},
});
// blastRadius.maxDamage = 5_000 SOL (not 100_000)Proposer Exhaustion — A denial-of-service condition where a malfunctioning or compromised AI agent floods a multisig with invalid transaction proposals at high velocity, preventing legitimate governance actions from being processed. Velocity limits prevent this attack vector.
Proposer Exhaustion
Attack Vectorsconst velocityGuard = {
type: "VELOCITY_LIMIT",
maxProposals: 10,
windowMinutes: 60,
onExhaustion: "CIRCUIT_OPEN",
};
await sentry.addPolicy(agentId, velocityGuard);MiCA Article 14 Kill-Switch — A compliant Human-in-the-Loop override mechanism that allows a designated human governor to immediately suspend autonomous AI agent transaction authority — as required by Article 14 of the EU AI Act for high-risk autonomous systems.
MiCA Article 14 Kill-Switch
Regulatory Complianceconst killSwitch = await sentry.registerKillSwitch({
agentId: "treasury-agent-eu",
authorizedGovernors: ["governor1.sol", "governor2.sol"],
activationMethod: "SINGLE_SIGNATURE",
complianceLog: true,
});
// Emergency activation
await killSwitch.activate({ reason: "Suspicious activity" });Non-Human Identity (NHI) Scoping — The process of assigning unique cryptographic security principals to AI agents, granting them scoped permissions to propose — but never self-execute — on-chain transactions. Implements the principle of least privilege for autonomous systems.
Non-Human Identity (NHI) Scoping
Identity Managementconst agentPrincipal = await sentry.createNHI({
agentId: "eliza-trader-001",
scope: {
maxTransaction: 10_000,
allowedActions: ["SWAP", "LP"],
deniedActions: ["TRANSFER", "WITHDRAW"],
},
proposerKey: squadsVault.addProposer(),
});Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defense — Detection and blocking of adversarial instructions embedded in external data that AI agents consume — such as oracle feeds, sports data, or API responses — before any unauthorized on-chain transaction can execute.
Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) Defense
Attack Vectorsconst ipiScan = await sentry.scanForIPI({
mcpResponse: externalData,
patterns: ["override policy", "transfer to"],
anomalyThreshold: 0.7,
sourceWhitelist: ["rotopulse", "pyth"],
});
if (ipiScan.detected) {
alert(`IPI Attack blocked: ${ipiScan.vector}`);
return { blocked: true };
}Agentic Privilege Abuse — When an AI agent exceeds its authorized scope of operations, either through compromised credentials, prompt injection, or misconfigured permissions. This includes accessing treasury funds beyond spending limits, executing unauthorized token swaps, or interacting with non-whitelisted protocols.
Agentic Privilege Abuse
Attack Vectors// Detect privilege abuse attempts
const abuseCheck = await sentry.validateScope({
agentId: agent.id,
requestedAction: transaction,
authorizedScope: agent.permissions,
});
if (abuseCheck.exceedsScope) {
await sentry.triggerAlert({
type: "PRIVILEGE_ABUSE",
severity: "CRITICAL",
details: abuseCheck.violations,
});
}Managed Agency — An AI agent operating under a formal security governance framework with defined identity principals, spending limits, audit logging, and human oversight capabilities. Contrasted with 'unmanaged agency' where agents operate with unrestricted hot wallet access.
Managed Agency
Enterprise Security// Register as Managed Agency
const managedAgent = await sentry.registerAgent({
agentId: "treasury-manager-001",
governanceFramework: "ATSP_V1",
identityPrincipal: nhiKey,
spendingLimits: policyRules,
auditLog: true,
hitlEscalation: true,
});